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JERRY L. HARPER*

Keeping Free Competition Fair in
the European Common Markett
At Carthage nothing which results in a profit is regarded as disgraceful ...
-3
POLYBIUS, Histories
Bk. VI, Ch. 56

Although unfair competition-in French, concurrence dloyale or concurrence illicite;' in German, unlauterer Wettbewerb-is a generally recognized

legal concept in the respective laws of the Member States' of the Common
Market, no uniform Community law of unfair competition exists. 3 The Treaty
of Rome provides the fountainhead from which flows a relatively sophisticated
set of legal provisions safeguarding freedom of competition; but to the hydraheaded Member State law is left the task of assuring the fairness of competition,
i.e. that the freedom to compete is not abused.' This article offers an analysis
of the proper role of unfair competition law in the context of Community competition policy.

*This article is adapted from a paper prepared by the author in fulfillment of requirements of the
Program in International Legal Cooperation, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium.
tJ.D., Univ. of Kansas, 1974; LLM in International and Comparative Law, Vrije Universiteit
Brussel, 1975; presently Foreign Relations Assistant to Sen. James B. Pearson, R-Kansas; member
of Kansas and American bar associations.
The opinions contained in the article are those of the author alone.
'French law distinguishes in theory between those acts of unfair competition which are motivated
by "bad faith" and those which are not, the former being concurrence deloyale and the latter concurrence illicite. But, as the decisions of the Cour de Cassation show, the practical consequences are
the same.
'Of the nine nations, the six original members (Belgium, France, Holland, Italy, Luxembourg
and West Germany) and Denmark have in common a basic concept of unfair competition. Great
Britain and Ireland recognize the concept of unfair competition in the context of the Paris Union
Convention to which they have acceded, but so far as their domestic law is concerned, the term is not
generally recognized. Instead, one must look for more specific actions as they have developed in tort
case law. Taken together these various causes of action encompass a body of law that can fairly be
described as unfair competition law.
'The Community has begun the task of trying to harmonize the unfair competition laws of the
Member States. See The Law of Unfair Competition in the Member States of the European Economic Community (in French), E.E.C. Document No. XIV/5593/68-D of April 11, 1968. But the
only specific provision of the Treaty of Rome resembling a law of unfair competition is the antidumping rule of Article 91.
'Ina similar fashion, antitrust law in the United States is primarily federal and unfair competition law is primarily state. It is argued by some that the United States needs a federal law of unfair
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. 2

254

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

I. The Importance of Competition
The Treaty of Rome aims at the establishment of a system of healthy competition as the essential condition for achieving a rational division of economic
activity in the Community.' It is essentially a treaty for more competition."
Public and private barriers to free trade are equally condemned. Competition, it
is posited, provides the best stimulus for economic activity because it guarantees
the widest freedom of possible action to productive forces. The interplay of this
decentralized decision-making process causes enterprises to allocate resources
efficiently and thereby to raise living standards and employment opportunities. 7
In the words of Article Two of the Treaty:
It shall be the task of the Community, by establishing a Common Market and gradually approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout
the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous andbalanced expansion, an increased stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of
living and closer relations between its Member States.'
It is only through the proper legal ordering and shaping of competition that
these Treaty aims can be realized.
II. The Legal Ordering of Competition
To be healthy, competition in the Common Market must be both free and
fair.
A. Free Competition
For the maintenance of competition two basic groups of Treaty provisions
exist. The first seeks to make competition possible, the second to maintain
existing competition.

competition. In fact, it has been asserted that the Federal Trade Commission Act is such a law. Cf.,
Bunn, The NationalLawof Unfair Competition, 62 HARV. L. REV. 987 (1949). Certainly the results
under the Federal Trade Commission Act are similar to what one would expect with an expansive
federal unfair competition law.
On unfair competition law in the United States, see generally CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS (1950).
'First General Report on the Activities of the Communities, at 59, par. 78.
6The Treaty of Rome is much more than this. But the political, social and other factors that serve
to delineate its full meaning fall largely beyond the boundaries of this paper.
'See First Report on Competition Policy (E.E.C. 1972) at 11-20; Von der Groeben, Policy on
Competition in the European Economic Community (in French), Supp. to the 1961 BULLETIN OF
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Nos. 7-8, 6-12; Von der Groeben, Competition Policy as
Part of Economic Policy in the Common Market (in French), 1965 BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, No. 8-5. But see Moss, The European Community Still Has No Competition Policy, 16 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 443 (1971) in which the author expresses some rather
harsh assessments of the Common Market.
'Unlike most treaties, which state their goals in the preamble, the Treaty of Rome establishes its
goals as part of the text. Thus the statements in Article 2 are designed to have legal significance
rather than a mere exhortatory effect.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. 2
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1. MAKING COMPETITION POSSIBLE
In the first set, the Treaty attempts to establish market conditions under
which competition is neither distorted nor perverted and under which competitors receive no government-constructed, artificial advantages. 9These consist of:
1. articles on the elimination of customs duties between Member States, 10 the
establishment of a common customs tariff, ,"and the elimination of quantitative restrictions on exports and imports;' 2
2. articles on the free movement of workers," the right of establishment,"4
6
the free supply of services,' and the free movement of capital;'
3. articles on the adaptation or abolition of state aids" or taxes'" which
distort competition;"
4. articles on the approximation or harmonization of such legal provisions of
the Member States as may tend to distort competition;20 and
5. articles on the coordination of policies relating to economic trends and
monetary policies. 2'
These provisions combine to create uniform Community conditions for free
competition without regard to individual competitors.
2. MAINTAINING EXISTING COMPETITION
The second set regulates that part of competition which depends on the
actions of individual competitors. It would make little sense to remove government barriers to free competition if similar measures of a private nature could
be erected in their place. As a result, the Treaty includes rules to maintain existing competition:

'One exception to this rule exists for industrial property rights. The Treaty recognizes other
societal interests in support of such legal rights as patent, copyright and trademark protection.
Article 36 leaves to the Member States the protection of "industrial and commercial property" and
Article 222 declares that the Treaty "shall in no way prejudice the system existing in Member States
in respect of property." Such provisions appear to encourage the maintenance of legal frontiers
precisely where the Treaty seeks to abolish commercial frontiers. As a result, the precise relationship of Member State law in this area to the Common Market competition policy has been, and
continues to be, the subject of litigation. The position of the Court of Justice has generally been one
of reading industrial property rights very strictly in order to prevent any interference with the free
circulation of goods. See, e.g., Establissements Consten and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. E.E.C.

Commission, Case Nos. 56, 58/64.
'"Treaty of Rome, arts. 12-17.
"Id., arts. 18-29.
1
Id., arts. 30-37.
V¥d., arts. 48-51.
"Id., arts. 52-58.

"Id.
161d.,
"Id.,
1Id.
"Id.,
2Old.

arts.
arts.
arts.
arts.
arts.

59-66.
67-73.
92-94.
95-99.
100-102.

"Id., arts. 103-109.
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1. those against restraining or abolishing competition, 22
2. those against discrimination on the basis of nationality, 23
3. those against dumping. 4
Without a rather formidable number of legal provisions, maintaining freedom of competition in a workable form might prove impossible. Left completely
to its own devices, free competition, once established, could easily deteriorate
into internecine warfare. Competition law, unlike the rest of the legal order
instituted by societies, promotes a state of continuing conflict. Indeed, any
entente cordiale between competitors which seeks to achieve economic peace is
always suspect."
This area of the law, popularly termed "antitrust" 2 6 in the United States, will
be so styled throughout this article to distinguish it from "competition law" which
is here defined to include both antitrust and unfair competition components. 7
B. Fairness qf Competition
To achieve its economic goals, not only must the Community preserve free
competition, i.e. free from Member State-created or competitor-created barriers, it must also keep competition fair. A state of competitor conflict is not to
be valued above all costs. For instance, it does not require countenancing efforts
to mislead consumers as to the quality of goods, because this would as surely
hinder the proper functioning of the marketplace as the maintenance of tariff
barriers by a Member State or an agreement to fix prices among competitors.2 8
Similarly, the expropriation of a rival's trade secrets by bribery would be both
morally and legally unacceptable although it might in some sense advance
competition.
"Id., arts. 85-90.
"Id., art. 7.
"Id., art. 91.
"5On this theory, see I CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARK AND MONOPOLIES (1967), par. 6.
"Because American antitrust and Common Market antitrust are distinct bodies of law regulating
similar types of conduct under dissimilar conditions and by not always similar methods, it is important to keep their differences clearly in mind. On the subject of Common Market antitrust, the
several good treatises include GOLDMAN, EUROPEAN COMMERCIAL LAW (1973) and KAPTEYN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1973). Also see Hawk, Antitrust in the
E.E.C.-The FirstDecade, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 229 (1972); Timberg, Antitrust in the Common
Market: Innovation and Surprise. 37 LAW & CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 329 (1972).
2
"rechnically this definition is inaccurate because unfair competition law is not part of Community substantive law. But it is the hope of the author that the need for this more inclusive definition will become apparent in the course of reading the article.
"Originally the law of unfair competition concerned itself with actionable wrongs between competitors. Gradually the focus is broadening to include wrongs to consumers. The Common Market is
also very much interested in the protection of consumers. See FIRST REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY (E.E.C. 1972), at 187 et seq.; SECOND REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY (E.E.C. 1973), at
163 et seq. Germany, Belgium, and Denmark, in varying degrees, now allow suits by consumer
organizations for false advertising. See Schricker, Unfair Competition and ConsumerProtection in
Western Europe. I I.L.C. 415 (1970).
InternationalLawyer, VoL 10, No. 2
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The competition sought is more like that in the boxing ring than that in a
back alley. The prizefighter seeks victory in conformity with the rules of the
Marquis of Queensbury, the streetfighter in conformity with the rules of expediency. "Fixing the fight" or "winning on a low blow" are equally forbidden
to the professional pugilist and the businessman. These so-called "rules of the
game" insure fairness of competition among business rivals and occupy that
area of the law called "unfair competition."

1111. The Law of Unfair Competition
A. Defining Unfair Competition
Napoleon aptly compared the subject of unfair competition to "a cloud of
doubtful consistency with vague and shifting outlines." 29 The only definition
common to all the Member States is that found in Article 10 bis of the Paris
0
Union Convention: 3
Any act of competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters constitutes an act of unfair competition.
But this commonality is limited to an international framework because only
France, Belgium and Italy have incorporated the Paris Union provisions into
their domestic law. Throughout the Common Market countries, the "vague and
shifting outlines" of unfair competition law have been drawn primarily by the
courts.
In Germany and Denmark, acts of unfair competition in business relations
are those "contrary to good morals"; in Belgium and Luxembourg, those "contrary to fair commercial or industrial usage"; and in Italy, those "not conforming to the principles of professionalism." France and Holland have no general
definition of unfair competition. Instead they rely on the judiciary to determine
what "wrong" means in a competition context and to apply that definition
under their civil codes' general clauses on delictual responsibilities. England
and Ireland have separate causes of action for specific torts, but no general
provision covering unfair competition. 31 Upon this framework the Member
States, at least among the original six, have built a body of law exhibiting substantial agreement as to what constitutes unfair competition. 32

"In the United States unfair competition has been variously described as "selling goods by means
that shock judicial sensibilities," Margarete Steiff Inc. v. Bing, 215 F. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1914), and as
giving "the crop to the sower and not to the trespasser," Bard-Parker Co. v. Crescent Mfg. Co., 174
Misc. 356, 2 N.Y.S. 2d 759 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
"See the discussion below of the Paris Union Convention.
"See the discussion below of Member State Law.
"ULMER,

COMPARATIVE LAW WITH SUGGESTIONS FOR THE HARMONIZATION OF LEGISLATION

(in French and in German) (1967) at par. 56. Since the accession of Great Britain, Ireland and
Denmark, Ulmer's five volume study of unfair competition law in the Common Market countries,
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. 2

258

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

While no attempt to classify the acts that have been held to be unfair by the
courts of the Member States can hope to be all-inclusive, there are certain types
of conduct that recur with some frequency. First, there is competition by interference with the business of a competitor. Included under this rubric are such
acts as boycotts by competitors, defamation of a rival, and disparagement of
his goods. A second group includes attempts to "catch" the customers of a
competitor. This is accomplished by acts likely to create confusion between one
competitor's establishment, goods or commercial activity and that of another.
The common law concept of passing off, false advertising, false geographical
designation and the use of another's trade symbols are examples. A third category encompasses.the appropriation of values created by another. This includes
slavish imitation or parasitic competition and the wrongful use of trade secrets.
Fourth, there are acts whereby a competitor steals an advantage by illegal conduct that exploits the observance of the law by his rivals. An example is pricecutting brought about by tax evasion.33
B. Sources of Unfair Competition Law
There are two primary sources of unfair competition law in the Common
Market: international agreements entered by Member States and Member State
law.
1. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
A. PARIS UNION CONVENTION

All nine Common Market countries are signatories of the Paris Union Convention, 34 which created a union for the protection of industrial property.
Articles 8, 9 and 10 protect trade names and indications of origin against infringement although the type of protection is left to each signatory. Article 10
bis adds to this a general clause declaring as unfair competition "any competitive act contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial affairs." By way
of example, acts which create confusion, mislead the public or discredit a competitor are cited. Thus the Paris Union rules represent the minimum protection

The Law of Unfair Competition in the Member States of the European Economic Community, of
which the above-referenced work forms a part (originally in German, but slowly being translated
into other languages), is being expanded to include their law.
"See generally The Law of Unfair Competition in the Member States of the European Economic
Community, supra note 3.
"The Paris Union Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883, was
revised at Brussels on December 14, 1900; at Washington on June 2, 1911; at The Hague on November 6, 1925; at London on June 2, 1934; and at Lisbon on October 31, 1958. Belgium, Denmark,
Italy, Luxembourg and Holland have ratified the London version. France, Great Britain, Ireland
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. 2
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that can be claimed in the Member States, and, in addition, provide a common
definition of unfair competition. 3"
B. THE MADRID ARRANGEMENT

The Madrid Arrangement for the Repression of False Indications of Origin on
Merchandise" attempts to provide more specific protection than the Paris
Union agreement against false or misleading statements about the geographical
origin of products. Article 4 of the Arrangement leaves to the courts of the
country in which protection is sought the determination as to whether a name is
a geographical indication of origin or a generic name (except in the case of viticulture products where the law of the country of origin is applied). Of the 29
signatories, five ate Common Market members.37
C. THE STRESA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO
THE NAMES OF CHEESES OF JUNE 1,

1951

This Convention," to which France, Holland and Italy have acceded, deals
exclusivelywith cheese products. It provides protection for appellations of
origin, names and descriptions as to the nature of the cheese.
D. THE LISBON ARRANGEMENT

The Lisbon Arrangement on the Protection of Indications of Origin and Their
International Registration of October 31, 1958,1 9 unlike the Paris Union Convention and the Madrid Arrangement which deal with indications of origin in
a very broad way, restricts its concern to appellations of origin." That is to say,
it focuses on the connection between geographical name and the quality of the
product. It has been signed by 12 countries including France and Italy.
E. BILATERAL AGREEMENTS

In addition to multilateral agreements protecting against various acts of
unfair competition, a number of bilateral accords exist between the various
Member States relating to indications of source and applications or origin."

and West Germany have ratified the Lisbon version. The text in English may be found in ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES (1966) (hereafter referred to as GUIDE).
"The jurisprudence and legislation of the Member States go far beyond this in providing protection.
"The Madrid Arrangement of April 4, 1891, was revised at London in 1934 and at Lisbon in
1958. France and West Germany have ratified the Lisbon version. Great Britain, Italy and Ireland
have ratified the London version. For the text in English see GUIDE, supra note 34.
37

Supra note 36.

"For the text in English see GUIDE, supra note 34.
3'For the text in English see GUIDE, supra note 34.
"See art. 2, par. I.
'4For a list of these, see I PINNER, WORLD UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW (1965), at 79 et seq.
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2. MEMBER STATE LAW 4 2
A. FRANCE

The common law practitioner may well find himself more at home with the
French law of unfair competition 3 than his civilian counterpart, for it is largely
a creation of the courts.4 4 There are several specific statutes aimed at certain
acts which are considered unfair. 4 But, seizing upon Article 1282 of the Code
civil, 41 the French legal basis for delictual responsibility or tortious liability, the

courts have fashioned rules governing unfair competition. The case law provides
an extensive guide as to what types of competition are unfair while still retaining
for jurists the flexibility to decide novel cases in the continuously changing world
of competitive conduct.
Today the jurisprudence presumes a fault in accord with the requirements
of Article 1382 in any competitive act contrary to honest business practices.
Damages may be based on either pecuniary loss or moral prejudice to the plaintiff. Judgments may include damages, prohibitions on the recurrence of the
delictual act, and injunctions against new infractions.
Certain acts, such as the improper communication of manufacturing secrets,
are the subject of penal sanctions. The Law of Finances of July 2, 1963, contains
a clause allowing plaintiffs bringing an action for unfair competition to request
a temporary prohibition on the continuation of the wrongful act.47 The provisions of the Paris Union Convention are also available to protect French nationals by virtue of the Law of April 4, 1931.
B. WEST GERMANY

The German civil law tort rules, unlike those in France, were specifically held
"2The discussion in this part is restricted to the laws of France, West Germany, Italy and Great
Britain. To a large extent, the laws of Belgium and Luxembourg parallel that of France; the law of
Denmark that of West Germany; the law of Ireland that of Great Britain.
In addition to the several treatises on the laws of specific Member States, there are several general
works that are helpful. These include PINNER (2 volumes), supra note 41; ULMER (5 volumes),
supra note 32; and BLAKE, BUSINESS REGULATIONS IN THE COMMON MARKET (3 volumes) (1963).
43

On French unfair competition law, see, e.g., ALLART, TRAITE DE LA CONCURRENCE DELOYALE
SAINT-GAL, PROTECTION ET DEFENSE DES MARQUES DE FABRIQUE ET CONCUR-

(1892); YVES

(1962); Giverdon, Les Dlits et Quasi-Dlits Commis par le Commercant dans
l'exercise de son Commerce, REV. TRIM. DR. COM. (1953), at 855; L. Roubier, Theorie generale de
faction en concurrence diloyale, REV. TRIM. DR. COM. (1948), at 541; R. Houin, Unfair Competition and Passing Off in France and Belgium, INT. & CoMP. L. QTLY., Supp. Publication No. 4
RENCE DELOYALE

(1962), at 86; H. Desbois, Unfair Competition in French Law. UNFAIR COMPETITION, B.I.I.C.L.

Series No. 12 (1966).
"Although cases relating to unfair competition will be found in the general collections, two
special reviews dealing with problems of unfair competition are Annales de la propi~tj industrielle,
litteraire at artistique and Revue internationale de la concurrence.
"E.g., Law of May 6, 1919 (appellations of origin); Law of March 26, 1930 (indications of origin).
'Article 1382 reads in translation: "Any act by which a person causes damage to another makes
the person by whose fault the damage occurred liable to make reparations for such damage." In
French it reads: "Tout fait quelconque de I'homme, qui cause 6utrui un dommage, oblige celui
par la faute duquel il est arrivi, a l reparer."
'"Compare this procedure with the "action for cessation" under Belgian law. The Belgian Royal
Decree of December 23, 1934, provides for a summary proceeding to halt acts of a competitor which
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. 2

Keeping Free Competition Fair

261

inapplicable to acts of unfair competition by the German courts in 1880.8 This
decision was based on the principle of freedom of commerce established 11
years earlier.4 9 Thus only those acts prohibited by a specific statute were considered unfair. The first general law of unfair competition, enacted in 1896,
brought together various statutes on specific acts of unfair competition. In
19090 it was amended to include a general clause:
Every person who acts in business relations for purposes of competition contrary to
good morals is subject to injunction and an action for damages.

This general clause has produced a large body of case law"' on unfair competition. 2
Similar to other civil law Member States, German law also contains several
particular statutes on individual unfair acts. 3 Penal sanctions exist for a few
acts. 4 By certain enactments, standing to bring actions is extended from an
injured competitor to include the entire industry." Moreover, the Law of July
21, 1965, grants standing to consumer organizations for actions in cessation
where essential consumer interests are impaired.5 6
C. ITALY

Initially the Italian law of unfair competition," like that of most of its fellow
Common Market members, developed judicially58 from the general clauses on
delictual responsibility. 9 In 1928, Article 10 his of the Paris Union Convention 60
are against honest commercial usage and likely to reduce the plaintiffs competitive capacity. It is
exclusively an injunctive remedy and heard by the President of the court.
48(1880) 3 R.G.Z. 67 (civil law tort rules are inapplicable to competitive conduct); (1895) 35
R.G.Z. 166 (no legally protected interest exists in an established business); cf (1891) 20 R.G.Z. 50
(French
rationale is rejected).
6
Gewerbeordnung 1869/71.
50
Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, June 7, 1909, R.G.B. 1 499 as amended July 21,
1965, B.G.B. 1 625.
"Although cases relating to unfair competition will be found in the general collections, special
reviews dealing with problems of unfair competition are Pinzger, Jahresberict uber Schrifttum und
Rechtsprechung zum Gewerblichen Rechtsschutz, Urheber- und Wettbewerberecht (Berlin 19341942); Sprenkmann, Jahresbericht uber Schrifttum und Rechtsprechung zum Gewerblichen
Rechtsschutz, Urheber-, Wettbewerbs- und Kartellrecht.
2
On West German unfair competition law, see, e.g.. I BAUMBACH-HEFERMEHL, WETTSBEWERBS- UND WARENZEICHENRECHT, KOMMENTAR (1964); GODIN-HOTH, WETTBEWERBSRECHT,
KOMMENTAR ZUM GESETZ GEGEN DEN UNLAUTEREN WETTBEWERB (1957).
"'For a list of these, see I PINNER, supra note 41, at 13.
5
"Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, supra note 50, paras. 4, 8, 10, 11, 12, 17, 18.

"Id., par. 13.
56(1965) B.G.B. 1 625. For a discussion of the gradual inclusion of consumer interests in unfair
competition law, see Desbois, supra note 43, at 28.
"On Italian unfair competition law, see ASCARELLI, TEORIA DELLA CONCORRENZA E DEI BENI
IMMATERIALI (1960); TEORIA DELLA CONCORRENZA E INTERESSE DEL CONSUMATORE, SAGGIDE
DIRITrO COMMERCIALE (1960); Mosco, LA CONCORRENZA SLEALE (1956); SORDELLI, LA
CONCORRENZA SLEALE (1955).
5
T1he cases on unfair competition law are contained in the general collections, e.g., Reportorio
del Foro Italiano; Repertoria della Griuisprudenza Italiana.
5
CODICE CIVILE OF 1865, art. 1151.
6
For the Paris Union Convention general definition, see supra text to note 30.
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was introduced into the domestic law." The general definition of unfair competition thus provided became the standard for determining the delictual character
of competitive acts. Then in 1942, the new codification of the Codice Civile
provided an alternative and more extensive statutory framework for unfair competition law. 62 Article 2598 included a general clause defining as unfair
competition any act "utilizing directly or indirectly any other means not conforming to the principles of correct professionalism and of a nature to cause damage to
the enterprise of another." Article 2599 provided for an action in cessation and
Article 2601 for one in damages. In addition, Article 2601 gave standing to sue
to the affected industry.
Italian law also provides a summary procedure for temporary relief in the case
of emergencies. There are a series of penal sanctions for certain acts of unfair
competition which may in turn serve as the basis for a charge of failing to act
with "correct professionalism" under Article 2598.
D. GREAT BRITAIN

In a British context, unfair competition, 6 as such, is "a social and economic
evil, not a legal wrong." ' 64 Thus to recover for an unfair act, it is necessary to
6
bring it within one of the recognized causes of action developed by the case law "
such as passing off, 66 injurious falsehood67 or breach of confidence. 68 Once a
cause of action is proven, the usual legal and equitable remedies are available.
Deceptive advertising may call into play the Trade Descriptions Act of 1968.
While Great Britain is a signatory of the Paris Union Convention, its provisions,
including Article 10 bis, are not a part of English domestic law.
IV. Unfair Competition In the Common Market
A. Some Problems with Nine Laws
The results of the Member States separately applying their unfair competition
laws may be in accord with a uniform Community competition policy. But the
fact that there are nine laws of unfair competition, each differing from the other

"Law of December 29, 1927, No. 2701.
2
6' CODICE CIVILE OF 1942, arts. 2598-2601.
61On English law and the concept of unfair competition, see ALBERY and FLETCHER-COOKE,
MONOPOLIES AND RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES (1956); CHORLEY and TUCKER, LEADING CASES
ON MERCANTILE LAW (1962); STEVENS, LEGAL CONTROL OF COMPETITION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (1961).

"FLEMING, LAW OF TORTS (1st ed.), at 742.
"English cases to which resort is necessary to discover a proper cause of action are reported in
Law Reports.
"For example, Reddaway v. Banham (1896) A.C. 199.
"For example, Ratcliffe v. Evans (1892) 2 Q.B. 524.
"For example, Robb v. Green (1895) 2 Q.B. 315.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. 2
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in certain aspects, strongly argues for an opposite result.69 Certainly it presents
numerous possibilities for preventing "an orderly functioning of the Common
Market" 7 ° and "the establishment of a system ensuring that competition in the
'
Common Market shall not be distorted."' 7
For instance, the owner of a well-known or famous trade symbol 72-mark,
name, insignia, etc.-enjoys a degree of protection against infringement by
those who would use the symbol on a dissimilar product that varies according
to the law of the particular Member State in which he is doing business. In one
state it will be protected from such diluting effects, while in another his symbol
may be freely appropriated for use on a dissimilar product. These diverging legal
standards may, on the one hand, encourage the owners of trade symbols to
restrict their trade efforts to protected markets; and, on the other hand, authorize third parties dealing in dissimilar products to gain an unfair advantage over
their competitors by making use of the trade symbol owner's good reputation
and advertising in unprotected markets. In addition there may be undesirable
consumer confusion as to the true source of the product.
Similar problems can also occur because of different rules in regard to appellations of origin and indications of source. This is especially true when one
Member State treats a geographical designation as an appellation of origin or
indication of source and another treats it as a generic name.
Slavish imitation of the efforts and organization of another poses threats to
the maintenance of equally competitive conditions. Because standards of slavish
imitation differ, a parasitic competitor can thrive under the law of one Member
State and be denied a stall in the marketplace by another. Varying legal protection of trade secrets and know-how present the same sort of opportunity for
competitors to steal an unfair march on their rivals. Moreover, these differing
degrees of legal protection may serve as a barrier to the transfer of commercial
and industrial information among the Member States.
Advertising, the subject of a rather substantial body of unfair competition
law, is also an area in which varying standards raise potentially serious obstacles
to the establishment and maintenance of a Common Market. Comparative
advertising, even when the facts presented are true, is unlawful in some Member
States, such as Germany; in others, such as the Netherlands, it is legal.

"At a relatively early date, some writers were discussing the need for a comparative appreciation
of the Member State laws of unfair competition. Ulmer, The Law of Unfair Competition in the
Common Market, (1962) G.R.U.R. 273; Schaeffer, Unfair Competition in the Common Market,
(1960) G.R.U.R. 285 (both in German).
"Tl'reaty of Rome, art. 3(h).
"Id., art. 3 (0.
"Trademark protection, although theoretically a part of the law of unfair competition, is the
subject of special legislation in the Member States. The Common Market is currently attempting to
create a single trademark law by convention.
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What constitutes deceptive advertising also varies from national market to
national market. Germany maintains a fairly rigid truth requirement, Great
Britain recognizes a certain latitude for "puffing," and Italy tolerates a rather
substantial amount of exaggeration. Thus, a competitor wishing to pitch his
advertising to a Community market must either develop his promotional
materials in accordance with the most restrictive of the Member State laws or
run the risk of legal sanctions in one country for conduct that is perfectly acceptable in another.
Gift and premium regulations in commercial dealings between manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers7" can also adversely affect Community trade
because of varying Member State laws. To take but one example, the manufacturer who delivers an automobile with a radio to a dealer may be acting in
a manner customary in the trade in one Member State and in a manner considered competitively unfair in another.
But these are essentially differences of detail and are not as important in the
context of Community competition policy as those differences of a more fundamental character. As an example, there is a substantial difference among the
Member States concerning whose interests are being protected by an action for
unfair competition. Is it only the interest of individual competitors as in the
Netherlands? Or is it also the entire industry in which the act occurs as in Italy?
Or is it, in addition to these, also the consuming public as in Germany? Moreover, should it be used to protect the small businessman from his much larger
competitors as in Belgium?
If the law seeks only the protection of individual competitors, its effect on the
Community, except in the case of those firms occupying a "dominant position," '74 may be de minimus. IsBut, if the protection extends to the entire trade
in a national market, its effect is probably going to be substantial in the Community.76 And if it extends to consumers, then the whole conception of unfair
competition, like a caterpillar on its way to becoming a butterfly, begins to
metamorphose into something new, something that protects both competitors
and customers from "all unfair methods of competition in commerce, and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce. ' ""

73
Provisions on rebates and special sales generally are effective only in local markets for consumers and therefore do not appear to offer the same difficulties at the Community level as gift
and premium regulations that apply to manufacturer-wholesaler and wholesaler-retailer relationships.
7
'See Treaty of Rome, art. 86.
"So long as there is no significant effect beyond the borders of a particular Member State, an act
of unfair competition is properly a matter of domestic law. Similarly the antitrust provisions of the
Treaty require an effect on trade between the Member States before coming into play.
"Vereiniging van Cementhandelaren v. E.E.C. Commission, Case No. 872 (1972).
"The reference here is to the American Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) as
amended 15 U.S.C.A. pars. 41-58 (1973), which provides such sweeping powers.
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So-called "fair trade minimum" laws and other forms of protection against
price competition, erected to protect the small businessman from his larger
competitor, depart rather dramatically from the economist's conception of a
free market and raise serious obstacles to its functioning properly when they
exist in varying forms in some Member States and not at all in others. Even the
varying nature of the Member State judicial procedures for obtaining relief from
acts of unfair competition can produce fundamental differences in the competitive structure. The availability of a summary procedure such as the Belgian
"action in cessation" makes of the unfair competition law a much more effective
sanction than that available in a Member State requiring a full judicial inquiry
before granting any relief.
Not only do these diverging domestic laws present difficulties, but so do those
of an international nature. The fact that only certain Member States have made
the Paris Union Convention a part of their domestic law; that Member States
have ratified differing versions of the Paris Union Convention; that only some of
the Member States have ratified the Madrid Agreement, the Lisbon Agreement
and the Stresa Convention; and that Member States have entered a variety of
bilateral agreements does nothing to lessen the potential for conflict with Community competition policy.
As economic integration increases in the Common Market and national barriers to trade recede, "European" enterprises will be increasingly exposed to
these vagaries of Member State law. Even harmonizing the unfair competition
laws of the Member States may not be enough.
First of all, the uniformity thus achieved will be fleeting if the future evolution
of the law is left to the Member State courts. Unfair competition is a very flexible legal concept that responds to unfair business practices as they are devised.
Its boundaries change from case to case. Left to the Nine, discrepancies in the
law will undoubtedly reappear as the independent judiciaries respond to new
situations. Thus the legal consequences of the same conduct will soon lead to
different results in the various Member States. To avoid this, a Community law
of unfair competition must be developed, i.e. one the meaning of which is ultimately subject to delineation by the Court of Justice.78 This would place interpretative decisions in the hands of the same judicial body that is responsible for
other issues involving the meaning of Community competition law. In this way
the maintenance of a.harmonious relationship between the complementary
goals of the various bodies of competition law would be assured.79
"See Treaty of Rome, art. 177. And see Callman, The Law of Unfair Competition in the Member
States of the European Economic Community, 7 INT'L LAWYER 855 (1973).
"The need for judicial decisions to take into consideration the meaning of the Treaty as a whole
and to make certain that national laws do not prejudice the full and uniform application of Community law has been recognized by the Court of Justice. Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse
Belastingadministratie, Case No. 26/62 (1962).
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Secondly, the administration of a harmonized unfair competition law by the
Member States may not be sufficient to properly regulate the activities of State
enterprises, i.e. "public enterprises and enterprises to which [Member States]
grant special or exclusive rights." ' Actions affecting the freedom to compete
in the Common Market are subjected to Community law whether they are
undertaken by State or private competitors."' Similarly, those actions affecting
the fairness of competition need to be regulated by Community law. Otherwise,
the substantial number of State enterprises in the Community become, in effect,
self-regulators.82
if the nine Member State laws of unfair competition are neither harmonized
nor fully integrated into Community law, these differing legal standards will
increasingly affect the behavior of rivals in a manner incompatible with the
creation and maintenance of a common market operating on the principle of
price and quality competition. Among the likely effects are these: making it
more difficult for individual enterprises to enter the market, impeding the free
flow of goods, and interfering with the maintenance of equal conditions of competition. 83 Thus it is not surprising to discover agreement, at least in principle,
among Member State governments and industries that the laws of unfair com8 4
petition need to be harmonized.
B. Some Problems
with One Law
'4
It has been said, perhaps too often, that the law is a "seamless web." It is
nevertheless true that any one part of the law interacts with the rest. Assuming
for the moment that there is only one Community law of unfair competition, it
needs to be analyzed in relation to Community antitrust law. It is that part of
the seamless web to which this article now turns.
Some acts are violative of both unfair competition and antitrust laws. 5 In
such situations injured parties may seek recovery on either basis.8 6
"°Treaty of Rome, art. 90.
"Id.
"While it is not the purpose of this article to discuss in any depth the possible ways of bringing
about a Community law of unfair competition, the subject is touched upon below.
"See the document cited supra note 3.
"See Harmonization of Unfair Competition Law-Summarizing Report on the Opinion of
Leading Associations of Trade and Industry in the Common Market (in French), Document No.
XIV/2715/70-D; Schricker, The Efforts Toward Harmonization of the Law of Unfair Competition
in the European Economic Community (in German), (1973) G.R.U.R. 141. As early as 1962, the
E.E.C. Commission gave priority to the gradual assimilation of the laws of unfair competition,
Action Program of the Community for the Second Stage (1962), at 31. But see Callman, supra note
78, in which'the author suggests that a Community law may not be necessary.
"Certain acts may actually violate Community antitrust law, Member State antitrust law and
Member State unfair competition law at one and the same time.
"6By way of comparison, American plaintiffs in this circumstance have exhibited a preference for
recovery under antitrust provisions partly because of the amorphous nature of unfair competition
law and partly because of the possibility of recovering treble damages. 15 U.S.C. 1 et seq. (1970).
The promise of the latter seems to have caused some plaintiffs to ignore sound. legal analysis in
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For instance, a boycott may violate both laws. Under unfair competition rules
a boycott may be sanctioned as a means of self-defense against imminent competitive injury; but if its purpose is an unwarranted attack on a competitor, it is
unfair competition. Any appeal to the public in connection with such an attack
may be actionable as commercial disparagement. And when the competitor's
customers are thereby induced to shop elsewhere, their role as independent
buyers in a free market economy is seriously impaired and the competitive
system is damaged.
Under antitrust law a justifiable boycott, such as one to protect a trademark
or a legal exclusive dealing agreement, may derive from the doctrine of ancillary
restraints. 87 But a naked boycott has no similar justification, is anticompetitive,
and is violative of antitrust precepts. A predatory pricing policy, such as selling
at an unreasonably low price to eliminate a competitor, also violates both unfair
competition and antitrust law.
Just which acts of unfair competition should be adjudged antitrust violations
and under what circumstances are not susceptible of clear definition." A
meaningful distinction, however, may be possible between those unfair acts in
which intentional concealment of the truth or dissemination of erroneous information is the essential characteristic and those which eventually reduce
private incentives to increase future production. Disparagement, passing off
and false advertising typify the first category; the misappropriation of trade
secrets and interference with contractual relations, the second. The former seem
far more likely to be detrimental to both fair and free competition than the
latter. The first almost never have a purpose except to stifle competition. In the
second group, on the other hand, some pro-competitive purpose is at least exhibited.
Some relevant questions for determining whether or not an unfair act is of the
attempts to characterize garden variety acts of unfair competition as antitrust violations. See, e.g.,
Ace Beer Dist. Inc. v. Kohn Inc., 318 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1963); Atlantic Heel Co. Inc. v. Allied Heel
Co. Inc., 284 F.2d 879 (1st Cir. i960); Parmelee Transportation Co. v. Keeshin, 186 F. Supp. 533
(N.D. Il.1960). This temptation does not exist under Community law because there are no comparable treble damage provisions. In fact, the Treaty of Rome does not make specific provision for
any civil penalties. But Sammilung der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes (1963) IX, 1,28, holds in a
different context that the jurisdiction of the E.E.C. Commission and the availability of an administrative remedy do not preclude individual actions based on a violation of the Treaty. Also see Houin,
Civil Consequences of the Rules of Competition in the European Common Market (in French), 8
ANNALES DE LA FACULTr4DE DROIT DE LIiGE 27 (1963).
'I CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARK AND MONOPOLIES, at par.
8.1(b).
"This same problem is before courts in the United States. C. Albert Sauter Co. v. Richard S.
Sauter Co., 368 F. Supp. 501 (E.D. Pa. 1973), holds certain unfair acts-including interference
with employment contracts, inducing breach of confidence and fiduciary duty for the purpose of
obtaining plaintiff's confidential information, and passing off by using deceptively similar names
and copying job orders, bid estimates and specifications-to be per se violations of the Sherman
Act. For a discussion of the case and the problems involved, see Note, 42 FoRDHAM L. REV. 909
(1974); Note, 59 IowA L. REV. 1194 (1974).
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type that also offends antitrust law are: Does the defendant's conduct give him
the power to raise or lower prices arbitrarily, to control quality and supply or to
force his competitors out of business? Is the conduct solely in the interest of the
defendant or is it also in the interest of the public? Does the defendant's conduct cause the public, in effect, to boycott defendant's competitors? Does it
result in chronic losses to most or many of his competitors?
Any act violative of Community Law may make out a prima facie case for an
action in unfair competition. For, to steal a march on a competitor by violating
the law falls outside the "rules of the game" that unfair competition seeks to
enforce. This may offer an injured party a more attractive basis for recovery,
depending on the law of the Member State in which the action is brought, than
a civil suit for recovery based directly on antitrust law. 8 9
While the two bodies of law provide theoretically independent bases for
recovery against certain acts, the practical effect of dual violations may be the
coalescence of the substantive requirements for recovery under unfair competition and antitrust law. In such an event, the respective bodies of law will be
given increased weight in the future development of their counterparts. Among
the other results this may serve substantially to broaden the reach of one or both
laws and to increase the possibility of unfair acts being incorrectly categorized
as anticompetitive and anticompetitive acts as unfair.
Other competitive acts will violate one body of law while winning the approval
of the other. It is in this area, where the theoretically symbiotic goals of the two
laws come into conflict, that difficult problems may arise.
In the Grundig-Consten case90 the Court of Justice effectively dealt with such
a conflict. Grundig, a German appliance manufacturer, entered an exclusive
distributorship agreement with Consten, a French wholesaler, and assigned to
Consten its GINT trademark rights in France. Consten, upon discovering that
U.N.E.F., another French firm, was importing Grundig products from Germany, filed an action for trademark infringement and unfair competition.
U.N.E.F. then petitioned the E.E.C. Commission to declare the GrundigConsten agreement violative of Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome, i.e., an
agreement that has as its "object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market." The Commission decision to
this effect was appealed to the Court of Justice. The Court held that French law,
which allowed an action by Consten for unfair competition to prevent any encroachment on its exclusive territory by U.N.E.F., could not be so used to
enforce an agreement that was illegal under the Treaty. Thus the decision of the
Court illustrates the danger that unfair competition law will move from its

"See the Sammlung case cited supra note 86.
"0Case Nos. 56 & 58/64 (1966).
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proper task of protecting competitors from free competition. When this
happens, the Court acts correctly in coming down on the side of Community
antitrust law.
On the other hand, the decision of the Court in the Hag case 9 appeared to
ignore a legitimate concern of unfair competition law. A German and a Belgian
firm each produced decaffeinated coffee. Prior to World War II they were part
of the same enterprise. But the German assets in Belgium were appropriated
following the war. As a result, the two firms had been totally independent
operations for nearly two decades. Both used the same trademark, but in separate countries. When the German firm attempted to enter the Belgian market,
the Belgian firm asserted its right to trademark protection. 9" The Court of
Justice refused to allow this because the firm's use of the trademark originated
in a common company and they were thus liable to divide the market by a
wrongful exercise of trademark law.
While this decision may further competitive interests in some small way, it
does so at a rather high cost in terms of unfair competition. By ignoring the fact
that the two firms had been totally independent firms for twenty years while
approving their use of a common trademark in the same market, it allows one
firm to capitalize on the marketing efforts of the other. More importantly, it
leaves the consumer in an absolutely hopeless position. For he must choose
between two products with indistinguishable trademarks, but which may contain entirely different ingredients by virtue of their independent points of origin.
The result may be a morning cup of coffee that is a real eye opener. It is highly
questionable whether the imagined anticompetitive effects that this decision
purports to prevent are more important than the unfair competitive conditions
which it seemingly fosters.
In the Dassonville case 93 the Court of Justice held that a Belgian law requiring certificates of origin on Scotch whiskey imported into Belgium violated
the Treaty. The Court reasoned that, since France did not require similar certificates, a French importer would be unable to circulate his stock of Scotch
whiskey in Belgium and that his right to freely circulate goods within the Common Market was thereby impaired. The sweep of the decision is such as to call
into question all trade regulations of Member States that exhibit a "potential" 94
for preventing the free circulation of goods. Here again the wisdom of the Court
should be challenged. While the increase in competition among Scotch importers that this decision may produce is commendable, the loss of certainty as

"Case No. 193/73 (1974).
:'rademark law is actually a specialized branch of unfair competition law.
'Case No. 8/74 (1974).
9'S.P.R.L. "Corn and Food Trading Cy" v. Etat beige, min. agriculture, June 9, 1966 (Civ.
Bruxelles).
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to the origin of the product will be resoundingly condemned by the Scotch
drinker who finds himself the proud owner of a bottle of Italian Scotch whiskey.
The solution to the Hag and Dassonville problem is, of course, the creation of
one law of unfair competition for the Community. And this may be the real
message of the Court in these cases."
A French judicial decision demonstrates another aspect of antitrust-unfair
competition inter-action. In St Manivet v. St Billion96 the court was asked to
declare a cartel's system of providing discounts to the "faithful" clients of the
Helenca-France Trade Association illegal under French cartel law and to award
damages for unfair competition. The court found that the positive effect on the
economy of the discount plan was sufficient to justify exempting it from the
cartel law. At the same time it held that civil damages for unfair competition
were recoverable under Article .1382 of the Civil Code.
Extending the same reasoning to Community law, French courts would presumably permit an action for damages for unfair competition without regard to
a cartel's status under the antitrust provisions of the Treaty of Rome. Although
most cases would present only a theoretical possibility of recovery, because the
types of practices exempted under Article 85(3) of the Treaty would beunlikely
to result in injury to a competitor, the rationale of the French case would
penalize conduct under its domestic law that was perfectly acceptable under
Community law.
The Court of Justice in the Walt Wilhelm case 97 dealt with this type of conflict in dictum by stating that a Member State law cannot be allowed to prejudice the full and uniform application of Community law. On the other hand,
the willingness of Member State courts to accept the primacy of Community law
over Member State law is not firmly established. A Belgian court has accepted
this principle, but a German court has taken a different position.98 Of course,
this conflict between the law of unfair competition and antitrust law could not
so readily occur if there were a Community law of unfair competition like the
Community antitrust law.
Comparative advertising also brings unfair competition and competition
policy into conflict. In some Member States publicity that compares the
products of one producer to those of another is forbidden on the theory that a
rival simply cannot maintain the objectivity required to prevent such com-

"See the discussion supra on this point.

"Ste Manivet v. Ste' Billion (1967), Juris-Classeur Periodique: La Semaine Juridique II, 15029
(Tribunal de grande instance de la Seine 1966). Noted in 20 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT
COMMERCIAL 499 (1967) and in 4 TEXAS INT. L. FORUM 194 (1968).

"Case No. 14/68 (1969).
"Minister for Economic Affairs v. S.A. Fromagerie Franco-Suisse 'Le Ski,' May 21, 1971
(Belgian Cour de Cassation); Decision of May 29, 1974, of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvL

52/71.
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parisons from misleading the public. On the other hand, such comparisons are
quite useful in provoking competition. Thus, it would seem that, so long as a
reasonable standard of truthfulness can be maintained, comparative advertising should be approved by competition law and not subjected to charges of
unfairness.
In the field of resale price maintenance, fair trade laws have properly identified price cutting as unfair competition. But large volume competitors have
challenged them as a restriction on their right to price competitively. On purely
economic grounds, their assertion seems irresistible. But for other reasons, such
as a social policy in favor of the preservation of small business enterprises, fair
trade legislation may be supportable. 99
Agreements among competitors to eliminate unfair competition are apparently not forbidden by the Treaty of Rome. Nevertheless, such agreements
should be watched closely to make certain that they do not become vehicles for
anticompetitive agreements. It has been argued by German firms that a policy
of open pricing is a requisite to fair competition and that selling at off-list prices
is unfair. Thus, agreements to adhere to the listed prices would not be in restraint of trade. Associations of German wholesalers have attempted to brand as
unfair all direct sales by wholesalers to consumers. They argue that the direct
selling wholesaler has obtained his functional discount by consciously misleading suppliers as to his true position in the distributive chain. But in each of
these cases, the German Bundesgerichtshof has declined to find any unfairness. 1oo
C. Some Future Possibilities
While it is true that the Treaty of Rome does not appear to require unification
of the laws of unfair competition of Member States, it is arguable that inequality of legal standards of competition in the different Member States constitutes
a distortion of competition within the meaning of Article 3(0.101 Under such
circumstances the E.E.C. Council may issue directives, as provided in Articles
100 or 101 of the Treaty, to eliminate the distortion.
But the benefits from such an approximation or harmonization of the law of
unfair competition are still not as complete as would be the case if it were possible to develop a single Community law of unfair competition. This may be
possible under the implied powers granted to the Community by Article 235 of

"American law in this area provides for fair trade legislation at the state level. While this support
for the maintenance of small units of business has generally been attacked by economists, the law
nevertheless continues in force. Miller-Tydings Amendment of 1937, 15 U.S.C. 1 et seq.
1°°B.G.H. (1958) N.J.W. 1140 (price discrimination); 27 B.G.H.Z. 369 (traditional channels of
distribution).
"'See the discussion supra on this.
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the Treaty," 2 and it is certainly possible through the vehicle of a separate convention to which all of the Member States accede. 103
The development of such a Community law of unfair competition contains
within it the possibility of new and far-reaching consequences. As fully equal
partners, unfair competition law and antitrust law could more rationally and
comprehensively regulate competitive activity-especially if the scope of unfair
competition law were to grow beyond its traditional one of protecting competitors from the unfair acts of other competitors. It is not inconceivable that a
Community law of unfair competition could become as all-encompassing as the
Fair Trade Commission Act in the United States. 10 Such an eventuality would
extend protection to competitors and consumers alike.
Moreover, a single law could serve as a gap filler for competition policy.
Thus, acts which might not technically violate competition provisions of the
Treaty, i.e., anticompetitive conduct in its "incipiency," would be amenable to
regulation as unfair competition.100 Certainly, it is only a few steps to this
position of the Court of Justice in the Continental Can case,"0 , where it was
said that conduct not within the prohibitions of Articles 85 and 86, the primary
antitrust sections of the Treaty of Rome, might still offend Treaty competition
law.
V. Conclusion
Member State Laws of unfair competition could better perform their role in
carrying out Community competition policy if they were transformed into a
single Common Market law. Not only does the existence of nine laws contain the
potential for economic distortion, it also withholds from the Community the
benefits that would flow from a single law. Such a uniform law could perform
the tasks now carried out by the nine, and, in addition, could function as a
strong deterrent to unfair acts by State enterprises, could create a greater degree
of judicial certainty for businesses, and could provide a legal tool to fill existing
gaps in Community competition policy.
While antitrust and unfair competition law are closely related, perhaps even
brothers-in-law, their goals do differ and can conflict. Antitrust law is designed
to protect and preserve freedom of competition. But, like most other freedoms,
it is not without limitation. Just as freedom of speech provides no license to

"'The powers supplied by Article 235 of the Treaty have not been clearly defined. It has been
used in the past as a basis for the acceleration agreements relating to the elimination of customs
duties and quantitative restrictions ahead of the scheduled dates provided by the Treaty. The
language of the article is quite broad.
" 3See the document cited supra note 3.
"'See supra note 77.
"'See the discussion supra.
"0'Case No. 6/72 (1973).
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slander, so too freedom to compete gives no right to do so unfairly. Thus, the
law of unfair competition limits rivals to conduct in accord with good morals
and honest business usages. While it is fair to compete on the basis of better
price or quality or service, it is unfair to seek advantage by resorting to tactics
that, even in a system of free competition, are reprehensible.
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